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FEE SHIFTING AS A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
ADVENTUROUS PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
Harold J. Krent*
Much of the recent controversy over President George W. Bush's signing
statements stems from his repeated assertions that he would not abide by particular
legislative provisions that undermine his Article U powers. For example, President
Bush objected to legislative qualifications for officeholders,' to requiring reports from
agencies that include suggestions for budgetary revisions,2 and to provisions directing
the President to act through particular executive branch officials,' all based on a threat
to the unitary executive. Moreover, he has challenged many provisions on the ground
that Congress should not interfere with his powers to control the foreign relations
of the nation. To that end, he has objected to provisions vesting in subordinate ex-
ecutive branch officials the power to negotiate with foreign entities,4 directing the
President to take particular stances in foreign affairs,5 and mandating compliance
with international agreements.6 Indeed, at times he has objected to provisions on the
ground of legislative interference with both his power to superintend the executive
branch and to serve as Commander in Chief. President Bush responded to the McCain
Amendment7 banning torture with a signing statement declaring that:
The executive branch shall construe [the Amendment] ... in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President
to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in
* Dean & Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Mark Rosen
for his comments on an earlier draft and Kristin Munsch for her research assistance.
I See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLYCoMP.
PRES. Doc. 1888, 1888 (Oct. 29, 2002); Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 822 (May 14, 2002).
2 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 278 (Feb. 24, 2004).
3 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 822 (May 14, 2002).
4 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1014 (June 14, 2002).
' See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Act of 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1718 (Nov. 14, 2005); Statement on
Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act of 2002, 38
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 49, 50 (Jan. 10, 2002).
6 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Appropriations
Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1014 (June 14, 2002).
7 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-0 (West Supp. 2007).
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Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the
judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective
of the Congress and the President... of protecting the American
people from further terrorist attacks.8
President Bush's reliance on Article II powers in signing statements to signal his
refusal to comply with numerous congressional directives has sparked outrage among
academics, 9 the press, 10 and the American Bar Association (ABA) leadership, which
issued a Task Force Report" condemning President Bush's use of signing statements.
Given justiciability concerns, judges likely will have no occasion to assess the
constitutional assumptions in such statements. No party can demonstrate the requisite
injury from a signing statement to give rise to a case or controversy. 2 There is little
way currently, therefore, for courts to step in to resolve the ongoing disputes between
the President and Congress generated by presidential assertions of prerogative in the
signing statements.
Senator Arlen Specter introduced legislation to create ajusticiable case or contro-
versy out of a congressional objection to a signing statement. 13 The bill provided that:
Any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading by the United States Senate ... may declare the legality
of any presidential signing statement, whether or not further relief
8 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of
2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
9 See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, EdgarAllan Poe, and the Use and Abuse
of Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515 (2005); Neil Kinkopf,
Signing Statements and the President's Authority to Refuse to Enforce the Law, 1 ADVANCE
5, 5-10 (2007); Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing
Statement (2003) (unpublished Miami University Ph.D. dissertation), available athttp://www
.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?miami 1057716977.
1" See, e.g., Editorial, History Makes a Statement, WASH. POST, July 30, 2006, at B2;
Charlie Savage, Bush Signings Called Efforts to Expand Power, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5,
2006, at A2.
" The Task Force concluded that "[tihe use of presidential signing statements to have the
last word as to which laws will be enforced and which will not is inconsistent with those
limitations and poses a serious threat to the rule of law." AM. BAR Ass'N, TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 20 (2006),
available athttp:llwww.abanet.orglcp/op/signingstatements recommendation.report_7-24-
06.pdf.
12 Courts seldom have adverted to signing statements, and generally only have done so in
the context of resolving disputed interpretations of the legislative text. See, e.g., United States
v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440,443 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003); Don't Waste
Ariz., Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972, 976 (D. Ariz. 1997).
13 Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006).
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is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable
as such. 4
Senator Specter summarized that the provision would "permit[] the Congress to seek
what amounts to a declaratoryjudgment on the legality of Presidential signing state-
ments that seek to modify--or even to nullify-a duly enacted statute."' 5 Senator
Specter's goal is to obtain ajudicial test of whether a President's constitutional ob-
jections to a particular provision have validity. In turn, if signing statements were
subject to review, Presidents might be deterred from rote incantation of presidential
prerogatives in the statements.
Senator Specter's bill implemented one of the ABA Task Force's recommendations.
The ABA Report urged Congress
to enact legislation that would enable the President, Congress, or
other entities to seekjudicial review, and contemplate[d] that such
legislation would confer on Congress as an institution or its agents
(either its own Members or interested private parties as in qui tam
actions) standing in any instance in which the President uses a
signing statement to claim the authority, or state the intention,
to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law. 6
The Report went on to suggest that a case or controversy could be demonstrated
because "the concrete injury was the usurpation of the lawmaking powers of Congress
by virtue of the provisions of the signing statement, and the denial of the opportunity
to override a veto if the President believes a law is unconstitutional."' 7
Senator Specter's approach, like that of the ABA Task Force, has little hope of
success legislatively. Even if enacted, courts likely would find challenges to signing
statements lack justiciability. Congressional efforts to confer standing on its own
members in all likelihood are doomed, despite the ABA Task Force's argument that
the Court would recognize Congress's inability to exercise a veto as providing the
concrete injury to permit suit. Almost the identical argument was raised in Raines v.
Byrd 8 and rejected. As the Supreme Court stated, a claim by a member of Congress
that an action "causing a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative
power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress" is not cognizable. 9
14 Id.
'" 152 CONG. REC. S8271 (daily ed. July 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter).
16 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 11, at 25.
17 Id. at 26.
18 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (holding that members of Congress lack standing to challenge Line
Item Veto Act).
19 Id. at 812.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has since rejected similar claims
of congressional standing.2°
Moreover, many of President Bush's signing statements, as in the McCain
Amendment example, state only that he will interpret the statute consistent with presi-
dential powers if a clash ever arises. For instance, President Bush's signing state-
ments protesting restrictions on his appointment authority assert that he will treat
Congress's limitations on officer qualifications as advisory only.2' No clash may ever
arise, for a President may follow Congress's advice and thereby moot the controversy.
Indeed, for a President to ignore that "advice" would risk a senatorial refusal to con-
sent to his nominee.22 More telling, even when a President in a signing statement
flatly announces that he will not enforce a provision on the ground of its constitu-
tional invalidity, 23 no case or controversy has yet arisen and will not arise until an indi-
vidual can trace an injury to the failure to enforce. Signing statements by themselves
do not create injury but only leave open that possibility for the future.24 Judicial review
of such statements would amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.25
Curiously, Senator Specter, as well as the ABA Report itself, ignored an alternative
line of pursuit. What if, instead of subjecting signing statements to direct judicial
review, Congress subjected the executive branch to an attorney's fee award in every
case in which the executive branch: (1) loses after it has declined to enforce the law
as written for reasons of presidential prerogative, and (2) had articulated its intent
to disregard the law in a signing statement? Can Congress, in other words, provide
an incentive to private parties to challenge executive branch action that departs from
20 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir.) (dismissing congressional challenge to
alleged violation of War Powers Resolution), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000); Chenoweth
v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000) (dismissing
congressional challenge to executive order for protection of rivers).
21 See, e.g., Statement on Signing Legislation to Create the Brown v. Board of Education
50th Anniversary Commission, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1336, 1336-37 (Sept. 18,2001).
22 A recent study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that, of nine-
teen instances studied in which the President had asserted the unconstitutionality of a particular
provision, the executive branch failed to enforce the law on at most six occasions. U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL
YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/
308603.pdf, at 1. In the others, the executive branch had either complied with the law or the
contested issue had never arisen. Id.
23 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002,38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 50, 51 (Jan. 10, 2002).
24 Finally, it is entirely unclear, even if Congress could provide for review, what standard
courts are to use to assess the "legality" of signing statements. Are they to assess the possibility
that a congressional statute could be used in a way that violated the Constitution? Are they to
guess at every possible scenario in which a claim of presidential privilege might arise from the
legislative provision passed?
25 Cf. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
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legislative text? On each occasion that the President in a signing statement asserts that
he will not fully enforce a law for reasons of presidential prerogative, he would expose
the executive branch to liability.
For instance, should the government be sued for torture in violation of the McCain
Amendment26 and defend on Article II grounds and lose, President Bush's reservation
in the signing statement would generate fees. Similarly, consider that President Bush
critiqued enactment of the John F. Kennedy Center Plaza Authorization Act on the
ground that it purported to make the Department of Transportation's (DOT) con-
tractual authority for the Kennedy Center "' [slubject to the approval of the Board,"'
which included members of Congress.27 Under the authority of INS v. Chadha28 and
Bowsher v. Synar,29 the President asserted that members of Congress could not exe-
cute the law as part of a group such as the Kennedy Center Board.3° The President
therefore directed the Secretary of the DOT to seek the advice of the Board before
entering into a contract but not to submit contracts for the Board's approval.3 Any
disappointed bidder on a project proposed by the Kennedy Center could later assert
that it was denied a fair opportunity to win the contract given the Secretary of DOT's
refusal to submit the contract to the Board for approval. The potential fee award
might embolden the disappointed bidder to sue.32
To be sure, many signing statements involving foreign affairs or appointments
matters will not lead to cases and controversies, whether the litigant asserts that the
President ignored the legislative command or not. Nonetheless, a fee shifting pro-
vision would broadcast Congress's displeasure with a President's use of signing
26 Congress has not but could create a private right of action to enforce the Amendment.
Cf Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing potential right to sue for
torture under the Alien Tort Statute).
27 Statement on Signing the John F. Kennedy Center Plaza Authorization Act of 2002, 38
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1576, 1576 (Sept. 18,2002) (citing John F. Kennedy Center Plaza
Authorization Act of 2002, H.R. 5012, 107th Cong. § 12(b)(5)).
28 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
29 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
30 See Statement on Signing the John F. Kennedy Center Plaza Authorization Act of 2002,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1576 (Sept. 18, 2002).
31 Id. at 1577.
32 Similarly, Congress, pursuant to revisions under the National and Community Service
Act of 1990, provided that the relevant executive branch agency was to consult with the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) before determining a formula in making certain edu-
cational awards. See S. 1276, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12605(2)
(Supp. V 2005)). In signing the amendment, the President objected to the role of the CBO,
again pursuant to Chadha and Bowsher, and directed that no consultation take place. See
Statement on Signing the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
876 (July 3, 2003). Anyone disappointed in the educational award might be able to challenge
the award on the ground that the formula would have been different had the CBO been con-
sulted. The prospect of a fee award might spur the disappointed awardee to action.
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statements to articulate or presage a departure from the legislative text and, in some
cases, provide the incentive needed to encourage private parties to curb such depar-
tures through litigation.
Sound far-fetched? Although lost in the debates over the propriety of President
Bush's use of signing statements, one judicial opinion exists directly on point. In Lear
Siegler v. Lehman,33 the Ninth Circuit considered an attorney's fee award arising out
of litigation over the legality of President Reagan's directive to ignore part of the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA).34 In response to a litigant whose
competitor's award was not stayed under CICA by virtue of the presidential command,
the court not only upheld CICA, but held that the President acted in bad faith in part
because he issued a signing statement that he would not comply with legislation due
to his belief that the Comptroller General's role encroached on his Article 11 powers.35
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),36 the court accordingly awarded fees
to the litigant.37 Although the court later reversed itself on the ground that Lear Siegler
was not eligible for fees under the EAJA, the case highlights the potential for a fee
award in the context of litigation over presidential prerogatives.38
In Part I of this Essay, I sketch the Lear Siegler decision. My point is not to assess
the probity of its analysis of signing statements-an issue that lies at the heart of much
of the recent commentary on President Bush's use of signing statements. Rather, the
goal is to show that fee decisions can implicate the propriety of presidential signing
statements, as well as the larger question of whether Presidents can refuse to enforce
law on the ground of presidential prerogative.
At the same time, however, the Lear Siegler decision shows that the EAJA as
currently constituted is unlikely to be a useful tool in future challenges to presidential
departures from legislative directives. Accordingly, in Part I, I briefly analyze those
limitations in the EAJA. The panel in Lear Siegler only reached the propriety of the
signing statement and accompanying directive to agencies to ignore part of the law on
the basis of questionable reasoning, and the court en banc later reheard the fee portion
of the case and reversed the panel.39
In Part 111, I suggest that Congress could borrow from the Lear Siegler example
to amend the EAJA to provide for fee shifting whenever the President has announced
in a signing statement that he will not enforce a law for reasons of presidential pre-
rogative and the executive branch later loses in court on the merits of that issue. Such
legislation would send a powerful message to Presidents that attachment of routine
31 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989).
14 31 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000); Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1115-26.
35 Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1121.
36 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
37 Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1126.
38 Lear Siegler, 893 F.2d at 208.
39 Id. at 205.
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messages taking exception to legislative encroachment on presidential prerogatives
is not cost-free. Although the instances for awarding fees may be few, opportunities
will arise in which litigants challenge executive branch conduct that departs from the
legislative command and was preceded by a presidential signing statement indicating
the departure.
Finally, I then explore whether such a fee shifting provision would serve the
public interest. I doubt whether the prospect of a fee award significantly would deter
Presidents from articulating reservations in signing statements based on presidential
prerogative. Nonetheless, the one-way fee shifting provision could, at the margins,
furnish incentive for private parties to challenge presidential departures from the legis-
lative command that are announced in a signing statement. Fee shifting therefore
would provide additional occasion for courts to assess the propriety of not only execu-
tive branch refusals to enforce the law but also presidential signing statements. As
important, enactment of the provision would place, for the first time, some legal con-
sequence on the now routine objections in signing statements based on presidential
prerogative.
I. THE LEAR SIEGLER PRECEDENT
In CICA, Congress created a system under which the Comptroller General investi-
gated protests by disappointed bidders alleging that agency contractors violated com-
petitive procedures.40 Upon investigation of the protest, the Comptroller General
made a non-binding recommendation to the agency as to the merits of the protest.41
To provide the Comptroller General with sufficient time to complete the investigation
before the work proceeded, Congress imposed an automatic stay on the contract award
once a bid protest was timely filed for up to ninety days.42 The Comptroller General
could extend the stay under particular circumstances, but the agency could override the
stay "upon a written finding that urgent and compelling circumstances which signifi-
cantly affect interests of the United States will not permit waiting for the decision of
the Comptroller General. 43
In signing CICA, President Reagan "vigorously object[ed] to certain provisions
that would unconstitutionally attempt to delegate to the Comptroller General of the
United States, an officer of Congress, the power to perform duties and responsibilities
that in our constitutional system may be performed only by officials of the executive
branch." He apparently reasoned that the Comptroller General, as an officer of
40 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), 31 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
4, Id. § 3554 (2000).
42 Id. § 3553(c)(1).
41 Id. § 3553(c)(2)(A).
44 Statement on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1037, 1037 (July 18, 1984).
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Congress, could not exercise any executive-type functions, including modulating
the stay that prevented the agency from carrying out the contract. As a consequence,
in the same signing statement, he directed the Attorney General to order agencies not
to comply with the automatic stay provision.45
A number of challenges by disappointed bidders ensued, including one by Lear
Siegler.' Lear Siegler had placed a sealed bid in response to a Navy solicitation to
provide fuel tanks for the F/A- 18 aircraft.47 Although Lear Siegler' s bid was higher
than that of the awardee, Israel Military Industries, it asserted that the Navy should not
have waived a penalty factor that would otherwise have been levied against Israel
Military Industries under the Buy American Act." In light of the Justice Department's
position, Israel Military Industries commenced work on the award, and Lear Siegler
thereupon sued the Navy to compel it to abide by the stay provisions in CICA and to
award Lear Siegler the contract.49 The Comptroller General subsequently denied the
protest on the merits, but the district court ruled that it should have stayed the contract,
finding no constitutional problem with the Comptroller General's role under CICA.50
Shortly after the district court reached its decision, the Supreme Court ruled in
Bowsher that the Comptroller General could not, consistent with the Constitution, per-
form the budget cutting functions assigned to it under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act (Gramm-Rudman). 5' The Court reasoned that the Comptroller General, as an
agent of Congress, could not participate in execution of the law.52 Upon the execu-
tive branch's motion, the district court reconsidered the Navy's argument.53 The Navy
argued that the stay modulating powers exercised by the Comptroller General should
be viewed akin to the budget assessment functions in Gramm-Rudman.' Both involved
implementing laws that bound parties outside the legislative branch.55
Despite Bowsher, the district court stayed the course. It stated that, in contrast to
prescribing budget cuts, the Comptroller General's stay modulating function under
CICA could not be understood as an executive-type power.56 Rather, the power to
shorten a stay was at most incidental to its advisory power on the merits of the
'5 Id. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) under the first President Bush similarly opined
in 1992, consistent with President Reagan's action, that the Constitution authorizes the President
to refuse to enforce legislation he deems unconstitutional. Issues Raised by Provisions Directing
Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Leg. Counsel 18 (1992).
46 See, Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 893 F.2d




"' Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986).
52 Id. at 726-27.
53 See Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1106.
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stay. 7 The Navy appealed, and Lear Siegler cross-appealed on the merits of the bid
protest decision.58
The court of appeals upheld the district court's constitutional ruling and decision,
rejecting the merits of the bid protest.59 With respect to the scope of presidential
power, it reasoned that the Supreme Court in Bowsher had not intended to prevent
Congress from vesting the Comptroller General with power to "affect" those outside
of Congress but rather to prevent it from exercising ultimate authority or "control"
over execution of the law as it had under Gramm-Rudman. 60 In the court's view, the
stay modulating power under CICA "is temporary" and the provisions "force nothing
more than a dialogue between the procuring agency and the legislature. '61 The court
subsequently denied a petition for rehearing on the merits of the constitutional holding.62
That much of the story under CICA is well-known. Another part, however, had
been unfolding at the same time. Lear Siegler sought fees against the Navy, first on
the ground that the executive branch's conduct was not "substantiallyjustified" under
the EAJA.63 The district court agreed but then altered course when it later determined
that Lear Siegler was not eligible for relief under that section due to its size.64 Lear
Siegler thereupon sought fees under a neighboring provision of the EAJA pursuant
to the common law rule permitting recovery of fees to prevailing parties demonstrat-
ing bad faith of their adversaries' conduct. 65 The Supreme Court has long held that,
although each party ordinarily should be responsible for paying its own attorney's fees,
fees may be awarded when a party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons. 66 The district court agreed with Lear Siegler, predicating
fees on the "bad faith" of the executive branch, asserting that the "government's
7 See id.
58 Id. at 1104.
'9 Id. at 1112.
60 Id. at 1108.
61 Id. at 1110.
62 See Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 893 F.2d 205,206 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting rehearing only
on attorney fees award, not constitutional holding).
63 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
6 See Lear Siegler, 893 F.2d at 207. Section 2412(d)(2)(B) limits eligible parties to cor-
porations with assets less than seven million dollars and individuals with a net worth less than
two million dollars. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
65 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), private parties can recover fees against the United States
to the same extent as could a private party under common law:
[A] court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys.. . to
the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United
States or any agency .... The United States shall be liable for such fees
and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifi-
cally provides for such an award.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
6 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
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conduct certainly cannot justify forcing plaintiff to bear the expense of litigation to
compel the government to follow the law. 67
The executive branch strenuously had objected to the bad faith determination on
a number of grounds.68 It argued that Lear Siegler could not be considered a prevail-
ing party given that it achieved no tangible benefit and did not itself present the con-
stitutional arguments.69 The House and Senate each had intervened in the proceeding
to defend the constitutionality of CICA.7 ° The executive branch also asserted that no
bad faith could either be imputed to the executive branch's conduct of the litigation
or to its underlying position that, in the absence of a priorjudicial ruling, the President
can decline to enforce a statute that he reasonably believes unconstitutionally interferes
with his executive powers.7'
On review of the fee award, the court of appeals first determined that Lear Siegler
was a prevailing party even though its bid protest had been denied. 72 Turning to the
bad faith issue, it summarized that "[a]n award of attorney fees under the 'bad faith'
exception is punitive, and the penalty can be imposed 'only in exceptional cases and
for dominating reasons of justice.', 7 3 The court of appeals agreed with the Navy that
the Navy's conduct in the litigation was reasonable. 74 However, the court focused
"on the government's conduct giving rise to the legal controversy: specifically, its
intentional refusal to abide by the stay provisions of CICA. '75
To the court, President Reagan's signing of the bill and then directing noncom-
pliance constituted bad faith. The court stated that "[o]nce signed by the President,
as CICA was on July 18, 1984, the bill becomes part of the law of the land and the
President must 'take care that [it] be faithfully executed.' ,,7 6 The court continued that
the Constitution does not "empower the President to revise a bill, either before or after
signing. It does not empower the President to employ a so-called 'line item veto' and
excise or sever provisions of a bill with which he disagrees. 77 Indeed, "[t]he only
constitutionally prescribed means for the President to effectuate his objections to a bill
is to veto it and to state those objections upon returning the bill to Congress."78 The
court concluded that the executive branch's asserted power to "declare laws unconstitu-
tional and suspend their operation" plainly constituted bad faith, warranting imposition
67 See Lear Siegler, 893 F.2d at 207 (citation omitted).
' Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 1988).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1105.
71 Id. at 1121-22 & n.14.
72 Id. at 1115-17.
71 Id. at 1117 (citation omitted).
74 id.
71 Id. at 1117-18.
76 Id. at 1124 (citation omitted).
77 Id. (citation omitted).
78 Id.
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of attorney's fees. 7 9 Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the attorney's fee
award."0 Through the fee award, the court excoriated the President's use of a sign-
ing statement to announce that the executive branch would not comply with the
provision of a law duly enacted by Congress and signed by him.
The court en banc later reversed itself on the fee issue, reasoning that Lear Siegler
was not a prevailing party.81 Nonetheless, the panel's earlier analysis suggests a pos-
sible role for fee shifting in encouraging challenges to presidential signing statements
announcing an intent not to enforce a law.
II. CURRENT EAJA LIMITATIONS
Lear Siegler is an anomaly. In all likelihood, it will remain the only opinion to
conclude that a presidential signing statement signaling departure from a legislative
command constitutes bad faith. The EAJA cannot be relied upon to provide fees
for private parties contesting the use of signing statements to stake out claims of
presidential prerogative.
First, as the en banc court held,82 litigants may succeed on a constitutional claim
against the United States without being considered a prevailing party. The Supreme
Court has made it clear that, to prevail, a party must be able to "point to a resolution of
the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the [adversary]." 3
Lear Siegler, however, gained nothing tangible through the litigation.8 Its challenge
to the bid was denied on the merits. 85 The fact that it received ajudicial declaration that
the contract should have been stayed pending the challenge is insufficient to confer
prevailing party status. 86 Indeed, Lear Siegler never even litigated the stay issues,
leaving the Senate and House, which had both intervened, to present the constitutional
issues to the courts.87 Private parties may not benefit tangibly from resolution of a clash
between presidential and congressional powers. Requiring prevailing party status,
79 Id. at 1123, 1125.
80 Id. at 1125. The court noted that "[w]e do not take issue with the Navy's assertion that
its constitutional claims in the district court and here, even though they do not prevail, are
not 'unreasonable' or 'groundless."' Id. at 1117. The court predicated the claim solely on the
President's antecedent decision to sign the law while, at the same time, declaring part of it
unenforceable. See supra notes 76-79.
8 Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989).
82 Id. at 208.
83 Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989); see
also Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007) (holding that party did not achieve prevailing party
status by obtaining a preliminary injunction, given the district court's subsequent decision on
the merits denying a permanent injunction).
8 Lear Siegler, 893 F.2d at 208.
85 Id. at 207.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 208.
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therefore, restricts significantly the pool of those who might benefit from a fee
shifting provision.
Second, a consensus has now been reached that federal courts cannot base bad
faith fee awards solely on pre-litigation conduct.88 Courts have reasoned that the
attorney's fee remedy should be predicated at least in part on the vexatious conduct
in prolonging or over-complicating litigation, not merely on conduct that precipitated
the suit.89 In Lear Siegler, the court of appeals specifically held that the Department
of Justice (DOJ) acted reasonably in defending the President's position on the merits,
particularly in light of the Bowsher Court's holding that restricted the duties that the
Comptroller General could perform.9 Not only must future litigants persuade a court
that the President's refusal to enforce constitutes bad faith, a proposition that many
would reject,91 but they must argue that the executive branch's position in the litigation
was unreasonable. Demonstrating bad faith under the EAJA has become more difficult.
Third, section 2412(d) of the EAJA limits eligible parties contesting the substantial
justification of executive branch action to parties with a net worth below seven mil-
lion dollars.92 Congress enacted section 2412(d) with the hope of encouraging small
businesses to challenge overbearing government regulation. Many parties affected by
presidential refusals to enforce the law, therefore, would be ineligible for fees. Indeed,
the district court corrected itself in holding that Lear Siegler could not qualify for fees
under section 2412(d).93 Section 2412(d), therefore, provides scant incentive to private
parties to contest executive branch refusals to enforce the laws.
Fourth, litigants with less net worth than Lear Siegler might still have difficulty
demonstrating that the executive branch's position lacked substantialjustification.94
The substantial justification test, like that for bad faith, combines conduct of the liti-
gation with the action that precipitated suit.95 Congress has stated that "'position of
the United States' means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the
civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
88 See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2003); Kerin v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 218 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2000); Lamb Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist.,
103 F.3d 1422, 1435 (8th Cir. 1997).
89 See, e.g., Kerin, 218 F.3d 185; Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., 976
F.2d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 1992).
90 See supra notes 51-53, 80 and accompanying text.
91 Many judges might not find that the executive branch's refusal to enforce a law on
grounds of presidential prerogative constitutes bad faith. See supra note 45. This issue occu-
pies much attention in this symposium.
92 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (2000).
9' See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
94 Finally, fees are capped under the "substantial justification" provision in section 2412(d),
even when a party qualifies under that section and can demonstrate a lack of substantial
justification, minimizing the incentive to sue. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A)-(B).
95 See id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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based., 96 It is unclear, therefore, whether a presidential directive not to enforce a
law would be sufficient in itself to demonstrate a lack of substantial justification.
Not only might the refusal to enforce have been reasonable but the executive branch
could also argue that its position in the litigation was reasonable, and thereby that its
position overall was substantially justified.97 Moreover, it could argue that its failure
to enforce stemmed from resource considerations as opposed merely to a prior presi-
dential statement based on presidential prerogatives. Resource-based explanations have
long persuaded courts that they should not compel agency action despite a seeming
congressional intent to the contrary.98
Thus, the litigation involving Lear Siegler reveals the very hap of the attorney's
fee award in the case. Litigation for attorney's fees under the EAJA as currently con-
stituted is unlikely to result in an award arising from a signing statement resting on
presidential prerogative.
Im. A FOCUSED FEE SHIFTING APPROACH
The Lear Siegler precedent suggests that a fee shifting provision properly crafted
could subject some presidential signing statements to judicial scrutiny. In this Part,
I first argue that targeting signing statements for review through a fee shiffing provision
would pass constitutional muster. Second, I suggest that the fee shifting approach
would generate a significant part of the benefits sought by Senator Specter and the
authors of the ABA Report. Congress might well wish to enact such a fee shifting pro-
vision: to serve the heuristic function of communicating Congress's anger at presidential
misuse of signing statements; ensure that presidential assertions of prerogative in sign-
ing statements have, albeit in relatively rare cases, a palpable impact on the govern-
ment fisc; and facilitate contexts in which courts can assess the propriety of presidential
refusals to enforce, as well as signing statements based on presidential prerogative.
With respect to the constitutional argument, most of the steps that Congress can
take to limit signing statements would be inconsistent with Article II. Presidents would
be on strong ground in objecting to any congressional penalty imposed for issuing a
signing statement. Presidents historically have utilized signing statements for a variety
of purposes,99 and issuing such statements plainly falls within the President's consti-
tutional powers. The President is free to criticize in writing or at a press conference
whatever laws he chooses. Whether the President signs a law and bewails aspects of
96 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
9' See, e.g., Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 364 F.3d 321,325 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
98 Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (noting that agency decisions not
to enforce are largely unreviewable because ofjudicial inability to measure factors including
"whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another").
99 See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTTUTIONAL AND INSTrrUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS (2007), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the law the next month, the next day, or upon signing the law should not be of consti-
tutional moment. Thus, any congressional effort to outlaw signing statements directly
would unconstitutionally infringe upon the President's power under Article IH.
Similarly, consider that Congress could provide by statute that appropriations to
the DOJ be lowered by a percentage point with each signing statement. Although the
issue is closer, the President should prevail in invalidating that congressional response
on grounds of a clash with his powers under Article IH. Presidents must be able to
communicate to the public, and even the appropriations power cannot be used to block
exercise of presidential discretion grounded in the Constitution. A statute purporting
to prevent a President from using appropriated monies to sign a presidential pardon
would similarly violate Article 1.100
Congressional efforts to preclude only those signing statements in which the
President asserts that a particular provision is unconstitutional would fare no better.
To be sure, opponents of signing statements have asserted that it is unconstitutional
for Presidents to sign bills into law that they believe are unconstitutional. According
to a number of commentators, Presidents violate their oath to uphold the Constitution
if they sign a law they believe unconstitutional.' 0 1 Yet those commentators have rarely
specified whether that constitutional objection applies to signing statements in which
Presidents assert only that a legislative provision could be unconstitutional in a par-
ticular context. Presidents are signing the bill into law on the understanding that the
bill, on its face, is constitutional even though it might transgress Article 11 in particular
applications. Many signing statements fall within this category. Moreover, other
signing statements advance a particular interpretation of the provision to avoid the per-
ceived unconstitutionality. 02 As long as the proffered interpretation is reasonable
and the Article 1I objection plausible, the claim that the signing statement violates the
President's oath of office rings hollow. Any effort to block signing statements that
assert only the potential inconsistency of the new law with Article II seems misguided.
In any event, the problem identified by the "violation of oath" perspective is not
the signing statement itself but signing the bill into law. Information in the signing
statement by itself causes no independent harm. Thus, any effort to ban signing state-
ments that assert the unconstitutionality of particular provisions not only would be
unconstitutional but would not even address the concerns articulated by detractors
of the statements.
' In reaction to President Carter's pardons of draft evaders, Congress in fact provided
that no funds could be expended to put into effect those pardons. See HAROLD J. KRENT,
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 81 (2005).
'o' See Phillip J. Cooper, Signing Statements as Declaratory Judgments: The President
as Judge, 16 WM. & MARY BIL RTS. J. 253 (2007).
102 See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Ass't Att'y Gen., to Bernard N. Nussbaum,
Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993), in Recent Legal Opinions Concerning Presidential
Powers, 48 ARK. L. REv. 311, 333 (1995).
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Alternatively, Congress, rather than directly banning signing statements, might
enact provisions to enable members of Congress or individuals to sue for a judicial
declaration that the presidential assertion of authority in a signing statement is in-
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Attempts to permit its own members to sue
for such declarations would, as discussed earlier, in all likelihood fail.1°3 Congress
cannot circumvent the case and controversy requirement merely by recognizing in its
members a right to sue.
Congress might instead enact a type of qui tam action to police any "false claims"
of presidential authority in signing statements. Citizens would thereby sue in the name
of the United States to prevent Presidents from asserting constitutional authority that
the Supreme Court and Congress do not believe that the President possesses. Indeed,
the ABA Task Force may have had such a mechanism in mind.' °4 As discussed pre-
viously, the signing statement by itself does not give rise to a case or controversy, and
it is doubtful that courts would recognize any congressionally fashioned interest in
having the President refrain from "claim[ing] the authority, or stat[ing] the intention,
to disregard or decline to enforce all of part of a law" to create a sufficient stake to
permit suit to proceed.'0 5 Moreover, although qui tam suits can be created to monitor
harm inflicted by private parties upon the government, they do not furnish a useful
device to monitor presidential conduct. A qui tam type action in the signing state-
ment context would contemplate a suit in the name of the United States against the
President acting in his official capacity. No historical pedigree exists for such suits.
Permitting the United States to sue the President would, needless to say, strain our
contemporary understanding of the system of separated powers and undermine basic
notions of a unitary executive.'0 6 It is the President as chief law enforcement officer
who has the authority to determine, within constraints, who is sued in the name of the
United States (and for what conduct). To the extent that Congress can confer that
prerogative on itself or a private party, the President must, in some fashion, be able
to superintend that litigation as it now routinely does for qui tam actions under the
False Claims Act. 07
103 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
101 AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 11, at 25.
'06 United States v. Nixon represents the rare case in which the interests of the United
States were distinct from those of the President due to the need for information in White House
files to conduct a criminal investigation and due to the fact that Nixon was an unindicted co-
conspirator in the case. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
107 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000); see United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002); Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir.
2001) (en banc); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that the President
must be able to superintend prosecution under the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act).
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The fee shifting alternative discussed,' however, has none of those deficiencies.
Fees would be awarded if the President's Article I position loses in court, and the
court finds that the President (or predecessor) had signaled that position in a signing
statement. The fee shifting would be triggered by the government's loss in court on
the merits of a case, not from the presidential signing statement itself. The presence
of a signing statement would be one of the factors making a private party eligible for
fees. Given that the EAJA is itself unproblematic, providing an award in a slightly
different context-when the President relied on presidential prerogative contrary to
a congressional directive-should not raise serious constitutional concerns.
For example, in light of the executive branch's loss in the independent counsel
case, Morrison v. Olson,"° there would have been nothing constitutionally suspect
about forcing the executive branch to pay attorney's fees to the independent counsel
on the ground that the executive branch lost on the merits, and the President had pre-
viously protested reenactment of the independent counsel statute even while signing
it into law. President Reagan asserted that "[a]n officer of the United States exer-
cising executive authority in the core area of law enforcement necessarily, under our
constitutional scheme, must be subject to executive branch appointment, review, and
removal. There is no other constitutionally permissible alternative .""' Upon losing
its challenge to the independent counsel law, the executive branch could have been
forced to pay fees to the victor."' Thus, the fee shifting approach avoids the likely
infirmities of the other proposed means of penalizing the President for excessive
assertions of presidential prerogative in signing statements.
The constitutional viability of the fee shifting approach does not suggest that
its use would be wise. In enacting one-way fee provisions, Congress may rely on any
of a number of rationales. 2 For instance, Congress may wish to deter a private (or
government) party's wrongdoing, seek to provide an incentive for a private party to
initiate suit, wish to provide greater compensation for an injured party, or endeavor
to minimize the cost of monitoring lower-level officials in the executive branch.' '3
10' See supra text following note 25.
109 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988). President Carter signed the Ethics in Government Act
but noted reservations as to the act's constitutionality. Statement on Signing Amendments to
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1130 (June 22, 1979).
"' Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987,23 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 1526, 1527 (Dec. 15, 1987).
..' Indeed, the Ethics in Government Act itself provided for fee shifting. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 593(f) (2000); see also In re Cisneros, 454 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (addressing fee petition
under the act arising out of Cisneros's investigation).
12 See generally Harold J. Krent, Explaining One- Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REv. 2039
(1993) (examining the possible public policy justifications underlying Congress's one-way
fee shifting mechanisms).
"I Id. at 2044-45.
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In the signing statement context, creation of a one-way fee shifting mechanism
could serve four principal purposes. First, it might deter Presidents from utilizing the
mechanism of a signing statement. That, of course, would presumably be Congress's
goal. Presidents might desist from including in signing statements any reservation
on the basis of a potential conflict with presidential powers.
The fee shifting mechanism, however, would not likely achieve a goal of deterrence.
Presidents, unlike most private parties, do not internalize the potential costs of a fee
award. Awards are uncertain, would likely be minimal," 4 and might even come long
after the President is out of office. The prospect of paying an award, therefore, would
not likely deter a President from issuing a signing statement reserving a claim of
presidential right.
Even if a fee shifting statute produced a deterrent effect, that impact might not
serve the public interest. Whatever one's view of signing statements, at least they fur-
ther a measure of transparency. Encouraging the President to relegate his views on
enforcing statutes in full or in part to internal executive branch memos may not
achieve the result sought by Congress. With signing statements, a member of
Congress at least knows where the President stands and can attempt to force
execution of the law in a myriad fashions. Congress can wield the usual means of
expressing displeasure by withholding funds, stonewalling unrelated executive branch
initiatives, senatorial refusal to consent to presidential appointees, and the like.
Second, a fee shifting provision would provide marginally more incentive for a
private party to contest a presidential position when that position both injures the private
party and departs from the congressional design, as in Lear Siegler. Most individuals
will bring suit only when they can expect to receive relief sufficient to compensate them
for the expense and risk of litigation. Some injured parties, however, lack the resources
to use litigation as a means to force their adversaries to provide effective relief. Even
when the litigation may impact a broad swath of society, as for most litigation involving
questions of constitutional right, it is unlikely that affected individuals will contribute
to the suit because of familiar collective action problems. And, given that many actions
against the government are not readily monetizable, the prospect of a fee award may
help persuade a party to risk fees to vindicate a principle.
As under the EAJA generally, therefore, the prospect of a fee award may prompt
future Lear Sieglers to take on the expensive risk of challenging a presidential action
in court. Little empirical work exists measuring the impact of fee shifting provisions
upon the incidence of suit, but correlations have been noted in several contexts." 5 I
would suspect that there would be sufficient incentive in most cases, irrespective of
the possibility of recovering fees, to sue the executive branch when its acts cause harm
in departing from the legislative text. Nonetheless, the prospect of a fee award might
tip the scales in some cases. Through the fee shifting mechanism, Congress would be
14 The claim for fees in Lear Siegler approximated only $30,000.
115 See Krent, supra note 112, at 2053-54 & n.57.
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recruiting private parties to take its side in disputes with the President and present
those disputes to courts for resolution where possible.
Third, although the deterrence rationale is weak and the incentives rationale
modest, the fee shifting model would be far more successful in another respect-
signaling to the President Congress's dissatisfaction with such presidential statements.
The fee shifting provision would communicate to the public (and the President)
Congress's strong objection to the use of signing statements to assert claims of presi-
dential prerogative. By enacting the provision, Congress, in a constitutionally ap-
propriate fashion, could craft into law a potential legal consequence for signing
statements such as those recently questioning hundreds of provisions on the ground
of inconsistency with presidential powers. Congress would thereby encourage private
parties to present to courts disputes impacting private rights when Congress and the
President disagree over the scope of presidential powers. Many have noted the bene-
ficial impact of Congress's enactment of statutes to reflect important policy views
even when little change is accomplished." 6
Finally, enactment of a fee shifting provision would assure more frequent contexts,
as in Lear Siegler, in which courts would consider the legitimacy of presidential re-
fusals to enforce. To the extent that the fee shifting provision induces private parties
to contest refusals to enforce, then courts will have more occasion to assess the merits
of such executive branch positions. Judges can clarify lines between legislative and
executive power.
At the same time, the fee shifting mechanism will allow courts to weigh in on
the propriety of signing statements themselves. Although the proposed fee shifting
provision would shift fees automatically upon a finding that the statement unpersua-
sively asserted a right not to enforce the law based on presidential prerogative, most
signing statements are not so cut and dried. Rather, they either warn of a context in
which the provision might trample on Article II values, or they assert a narrowing inter-
pretation in light of Article RI. Judges, therefore, would need to develop standards with
which to determine whether signing statements legitimately sought to avoid a consti-
tutional question through a plausible, narrowing construction, or appropriately warned
of a future circumstance in which the provision would collide with Article II values.
Judicial oversight might lead to more circumscribed use of signing statements in the
future.
Note that Congress could enact a broader fee shifting provision that would
cover any instance in which the President stakes out a position in conflict with that
of Congress, whether or not the issue touches on presidential powers. Congress could
determine that presidential signing statements warning of a clash with the Fourth
116 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1520-28 (2000).
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Amendment"t7 or Due Process Clause" 8 are just as divisive as those warning of
inconsistency with presidential powers.
Yet, presidential signing statements noting reservations on non-Article H grounds
can play a critical role in protecting individual rights. For instance, President Bush
noted that Congress had embraced a variety of warrantless searches under the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005.119 He signed the
Act but signaled that all such searches must conform to the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment. 120 President Clinton signaled greater concern for rights of privacy and
speech in signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.121 Such signing statements,
even if critical of legislation, invite further dialogue. To be sure, other signing state-
ments, as in the affirmative action context, seem to restrict the scope of individual
rights. 12 2 Irrespective of whether the presidential statement seems to enlarge or re-
strict the individual right, however, courts are likely to address such rights issues even
if Congress provides no additional incentive for suit. The fee shifting remedy is not
necessary to induce suit, and given that Article II powers are not in question, there is
less reason to fear presidential aggrandizement of power. Any proposed fee shifting
provision should permit recovery only when Presidents object in signing statements
to provisions based on assertions of Article UI authority. After all, the core challenge
posed by President Bush's use of signing statements rests with his assertions of presi-
dential prerogative not with interpretations of other constitutional provisions.
Alternatively, Congress could establish a fee shifting mechanism to deter presi-
dential refusals to enforce the law whether or not the President has indicated such
disagreement in a signing statement. Congress might desire courts to umpire as many
congressional/presidential splits as possible. The signing statement, although an irri-
tant, may be of secondary importance to ensuring that the President faithfully executes
the laws. However, the issue of presidential refusals to enforce particular provisions-
in the absence of presidential statements announcing the non-enforcement-presents
a set of additional concerns. How can one tell when a refusal to enforce rests on a con-
stitutional principle? What if the refusal stems from a disputed interpretation of law and
11" See, e.g., Statement on Signing Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act of 2005 into Law, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1273, 1274 (Aug. 10, 2005).
118 See, e.g., Statement on Signing Help America Vote Act of 2002 into Law, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1888 (Oct. 29, 2002).
"9 Statement on Signing Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act
of 2005 into Law, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1273, 1274 (Aug. 10, 2005).
120 id.
121 Statement on Signing Telecommunications Act of 1996 into Law, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 218,219 (Feb. 8, 1996); Statement on Signing Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction
Act of 1997 into Law, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 617, 618 (Apr. 30, 1997) ("The Depart-
ment of Justice[] advised that a broad construction of []section [5(a)(3)] would raise serious
First Amendment concerns.").
122 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 1014 (June 14, 2002).
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not from constitutional principle? What if the refusal is resource-based or if conditions
have materially changed since enactment of a law? In addition, focusing on all refusals
to enforce misses the unique concerns raised by the nearly one thousand provisions
challenged by President Bush predominantly on Article RI grounds. Thus, any fee shift-
ing proposal should focus only on presidential refusals to enforce that are announced
in signing statements and stem from the President's view of his own authority.
In short, Congress should abandon any goal of subjecting presidential signing
statements directly to judicial review. Instead, it should consider enacting a fee shift-
ing provision to encourage private parties to challenge presidential acts, or refusals to
act, when they cause injury or conflict with congressional directives and the conflict
is presaged in a presidential signing statement.
CONCLUSION
Presidential signing statements hit a raw nerve among members of Congress and
the public alike. They often appear to flaunt presidential authority while flouting the
primary policymaking role of Congress.
Despite recent congressional steps, efforts to make presidential signing state-
ments subject to judicial review are not feasible. No case or controversy is presented
by congressional outrage. Nevertheless, a fee shifting provision can, at the margins,
encourage lawsuits against Presidents for refusals to enforce the law and, in so doing,
facilitate review of presidential signing statements. At the same time, Congress's
enactment of such a fee shifting provision would, for the first time, impose some legal
consequence on presidential use of signing statements to announce objections based
on presidential prerogative. Providing additional contexts in which judges can assess
executive branch non-enforcement and signing statements announcing that intent
may dampen the zeal with which Presidents use signing statements to assert presidential
prerogatives. Finally, through revision of the Equal Access to Justice Act, future Lear
Sieglers would gain more complete redress for any injuries suffered by virtue of a
President's refusal to comply with the law.
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